In recent years there has been a constant discussion of the need to reform value added tax and this discussion has become increasingly relevant with the development of a long-term strategy for socio-economic development. Whereas some have proposed that the rate of VAT should be reduced, more radical "reformers" are examining the implications of replacing VAT with a sales tax or of using the Addition Method for the calculation of VAT. 2 Critics of the present system argue that particular defects of the tax and the complexity of its administration render it inefficient not only in Russia but also in other countries. Above all, there are problems relating to VAT refunds and offsets against tax, which in some cases deter Russian companies from competing in export markets. There are also problems arising from the use of various illegal schemes for minimizing payment, avoiding tax and even obtaining direct illegal refunds from the budget.
extremely important during the current financial crisis. So any proposed measures for reform should be subjected to careful cost-benefit analysis.
What is the Background?
During the past 45 years VAT, as a tax on consumption, has almost everywhere replaced sales tax. In 1965 only three OECD countries used VAT, but at the present time it is used in 29 out of 30 OECD countries (not including the US).
The adoption of VAT was in part inspired by the process of European integration -a variety of largely incompatible models of cascading taxes were replaced by a uniform system of VAT. In conditions of economic globalization and development of international trade, the introduction of VAT, which involves taxation of international supplies according to the country of destination, was admirably suited to the logic of taxation of consumption.
However, there were other reasons for the transition to VAT:
Firstly, under VAT enables revenues to be more easily linked to efficiency of production than does sales tax. 5 Also, it has less of a distorting effect on consumer choice than a unitary or cascading sales tax;
Secondly, VAT has a broader tax base, being applicable not only to retail sales, but also to all of the non-productive purchases of which the enterprise is the end user, including the purchase of services performed by the enterprise for its own use;
Thirdly, the widespread transition to VAT took place at a time of significant growth of public expenditure, when it was clear that, if growing social needs were to be met, it would be necessary either significantly to increase income tax or find new sources of revenue that would be sustainable over time, guarantee a steady flow of income to the budget throughout the year, and bring in significant sums. The choice was made in favor of taxing consumption;
Finally, since VAT involves the collection of tax at all stages of production, it guarantees a steady flow of revenues, irrespective of short-term volatilities in retail trade, external shocks, and the behaviour of particular categories of taxpayer (the problem of tax avoidance). In fact, the VAT tax base has been, as a rule, defined so broadly that any variations to it depend only on the dynamics of economic growth. Structural changes and external factors, by contrast, have little impact. 5 The base of cascading sales taxes that were levied in European countries often included capital investments, including the amount of tax paid on the value of fixed assets. This was subsequently reimbursed through depreciation (this procedure was applied in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). Value added tax paid on capital investments is subject to a full refund, as with the other goods and services purchased, and this ensures the neutrality of the tax as regards choices between consumption and investment.
As the number of countries using VAT has increased, 6 the share of the budget revenues of OECD countries deriving from VAT and from sales taxes has also increased (see Table 1 ).
At the same time, there has been a noticeable decline in the share of all taxes on consumption owing to a relative decline in revenues from excise and other specific taxes. However, for all its worldwide popularity, in nearly all OECD countries the administration of VAT has become increasingly complex, owing to the use of a variety of concessions (exemptions, lower tax rates). The result has been a decline in tax revenues, increasing administrative costs and risks in relation to collectability. It is clear that the dependence of VAT on exemptions and refunds makes it more expensive to administer than income tax or sales tax. Companies that pay more "input VAT" as compared to "output VAT" are entitled to a refund. As a rule, these are either companies at the lower level of processing or exporters. In so far as the submission of false (fictitious) applications for a VAT refund is tantamount to an appropriation of budget funds, there has had to be increasing audit of applications for refund.
Estimation of the true scope of losses to the budget as a consequence of schemes for evasion or refund is a matter of expertise, and it is only in the UK that revenue losses resulting from non-compliance with VAT legislation is calculated annually. In the UK estimates are made of VAT Tax Theoretical Liability (VTTL) on the basis of national consumption data, which are then compared with actual VAT revenue to determine the gap in VAT collection (the VAT tax gap). The tax gap for the period 2002 to 2007 has increased from 12.4 to 16.1%. In other European countries there are less rigorous calculations that have evaluated losses from non-payment of VAT through fraud at about 10% of total tax revenue.
The struggle against VAT fraud is a trade-off between reducing the cost of administering the tax and minimizing the risk of fraudulent refund. The latter risk can be reduced by giving tax inspectors more time to check the validity of applications for refund;
but at the cost of delays in compensating honest taxpayers that have the effect of reducing their liquidity and competitiveness.
The Cost of reducing VAT to 12%
Problems with the administration of VAT, a sharp decline in tax revenues (in 2006) against a background of favorable conditions in the world market for raw materials, relatively rapid economic growth and an increase in tax revenues to the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation gave rise to the argument that the basic rate of VAT should be reduced to 12-13 % and the reduced rate of VAT abolished. 7 The assumption was that this would significantly improve the investment activity of manufacturing enterprises and encourage the development of innovative industries with high added value.
There can be no doubt that reducing VAT in circumstances in which the benefits for the population and the business community are unclear will result in a reduction of revenues to the Federal budget.
Given that the benefits of a reduction will be distributed in inverse proportion to the elasticity of the response of business entities in the market, in the medium term the total savings to the economy will be distributed between the population and businesses in a ratio based on the flexibility of supply and demand for each individual product. However, in the longer term, it is mainly consumers who will benefit from a reduction in VAT since the elasticity of supply will tend towards infinity.
This being the case, we have reviewed three model scenarios in a 3-year time frame (assuming that the elasticity of markets in the medium term remains unchanged):
The first scenario assumes that with VAT reduced to 12% prices will fall by the same amount (all benefits from the lower rate will be to consumers). This would be characteristic for markets with perfect elasticity of supply or inelasticity of demand); 7 The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade proposes to reduce the tax rate from 18% to 12%. In the opinion of Deputy Minister S.Voskresensky this would make an important contribution to the development of the tax system, ensuring that "taxes will be collected when the taxpayers are already making money, rather than at the stage of investment and production"// No. 17 (606) Expert, April 28, 2008.
The second scenario assumes that prices will remain unchanged (markets with perfect elasticity of demand and inelasticity of supply) and all benefits from the reduction of VAT will accrue to producers;
The third scenario assumes that prices will fall by half of the reduction in the rate of tax, i.e., by 3% (in other words, the benefits of the reduction in VAT will be distributed equally between the consumers and producers).
Consequently, the algorithm for calculation of the impact on the budget of a reduction in VAT in each of the above scenarios will be as follows.
In the first scenario we can assume that enterprises will obtain no additional financial resources directly; by contrast, households will benefit from a fall in retail prices, which will encourage higher spending owing to the marginal propensity to consume (the multiplier effect of consumption). Higher spending will result in a growth of GDP, which will stimulate a growth of induced investment. In our case it is assumed that a part of the GDP formed during
the first year of the new VAT rate will be used to finance investment in the second year, which in turn will ensure the formation of additional GDP.
In this way, the overall growth of GDP in the second and subsequent years will be equal to the aggregate growth of GDP as a consequence of the effect of multipliers of consumption and investment expenditure.
This means that in terms of impact upon the budget, a reduction in VAT would result in direct losses to the budget by the amount of decreased revenue from VAT and an increase in revenue from tax on profits, unified social tax and personal income tax as a result of a redistribution of the total growth in GDP.
In the second scenario the algorithm of assessment is practically identical. Thus, if the benefits from reduced rates accrue directly to enterprises, their profits will increase whilst other elements in prices will remain constant. Under the existing system of financial management, the additional profit will be spent on consumption (increase in wages, growth of the consumption fund) on investment (increase in fixed capital), whilst a share of the funds would remain undistributed. Ultimately, an increase in the wage fund will encourage additional demand and growth in GDP through the multiplier of consumer spending. An increase in investment will also make for a growth in GDP, albeit with some time lag.
The third scenario, will contain elements of both of these algorithms in equal measure.
To sum up, a reduction in VAT will have the following consequences for the budget:
 direct losses to the federal budget by the amount of potential revenues from VAT;
 growth of revenues from profits tax on enterprises, single social tax and personal income tax.
Evaluation of the direct losses deriving from the reduction of VAT revenues (see Table   2 ) was based on following assumptions:
 the share of revenues from VAT on imports charged at a rate of 10% constitutes about 7.5% of all VAT revenues from imports;
 the share of revenues from VAT on domestic transactions at the rate of 18%
constitutes about 95% of all VAT revenues;
 in estimates of the tax base for VAT revenues in the domestic market revenues from the Yukos oil company were not included;
 the structure of the tax base, the grounds for allowing deductions and exemptions remain at the level of 2007.
The calculations were made before the crisis, but they give an idea of the consequences of a reduction of VAT in conditions of normal economic development. Data used for estimates for 2009-2011 are by now outdated. However, the authors see no need to amend the information base for calculations, in so far as these estimates illustrate the impact on the budget system of a reduction in VAT after the emergence of the economy from the crisis. However, the effect of a reduction in VAT will be not only direct losses to the budget by the amount of potential revenues from VAT, but an increase in revenues from profits tax, unified social tax and personal income tax owing to increased sales by producers (or the volume of trade) and extension of the base of these taxes Taking this into account, the losses to the budget has been estimated under the three model scenarios of distribution of payment of VAT amongst consumers and producers as described above.
In addition, for all scenarios the following assumptions were made:
1) According to the estimates, about 77% of all funds of households released thanks to the reduction in VAT will be spent in the domestic market and will stimulate the growth of GDP. We assume that the remainder will be taken out of circulation and contribute to the savings of the population.
2) Taking into account the existing structure of GDP (see Table. 3), we can conclude that the growth of the base for profits tax, unified social tax and personal income tax will match not the entire growth in GDP, but only that a part of it that comprises "official wages of employees" (on average, 34% of the growth of GDP) and the "net profits of the economy and net mixed income" (on average, 31% of the growth of GDP). that the remaining 80% are used to finance current activities taking into account the formation of the liquidity reserve: around 42% of all net profits will go towards increasing the wages of employees (including deductions for social insurance) and towards dividend payments and the remainder will go towards the creation of liquidity reserves in the form of investments in financial assets, including cash assets in current accounts and towards other tax payments associated with increases in the volume of production. 4) During 2009-2011 the multiplier of consumer spending remains unchanged and is assumed to be 2.27. Meanwhile, the growth of GDP attributable to the multiplier effect of investment is 0.32 kopeks on each ruble of funds invested in the preceding year.
5) The rate of collection of VAT in the period under review remained unchanged.
The results of estimates of the impact of the reduction of VAT to 12% on the budget in the period 2009-2011 are presented in Tables 4-6. Our analysis of the impact of reduced VAT on budget revenues therefore indicates that the reduction of VAT to 12% under extreme scenarios of distribution of the VAT burden between consumers and producers (the first and second scenarios) would result in losses in VAT tax revenues of 1.08-1.14% of GDP. In the third scenario, where the VAT burden is shared equally between consumers and producers, fiscal losses resulting from the lowering of the tax would be minimal -about 0.9% of GDP.
The reduction of VAT to 12% would therefore have a fairly significant impact upon the budget. At the same time, it is not evident that a reduction in VAT would provide a stimulus to business activity and the level of investment.
Consequences for the budget of replacing VAT with a sales tax
As a way of dealing with the deficiencies of VAT, it has been proposed that it should be replaced by a sales tax. Sales tax has been proposed as an alternative because it is thought to be easy to administer for both tax authorities and taxpayers. However, in theory and in practice this is not so. Whilst the tax authorities do have to supervise a significant range of taxpayers under VAT, the bulk of the tax revenue is paid by a relatively small number of organizations (in Russia the largest taxpayers provide up to 80% of total revenues from VAT). By contrast, sales tax is levied only at the stage of final consumption and so, in the event of its being introduced, the tax authorities would have to restructure their effort so as to monitor the tax compliance of hundreds of thousands of retailers. The possibilities for tax evasion, as well as the risks for budget revenues are greater and the potential risk is proportional to the rate of sales tax -the benefits of tax evasion if the tax rate is relatively high (15-20%) significantly exceed losses from potential penalties for non-compliance.
Another advantage of VAT is that for all products and services an obligation for payment is placed upon different taxpayers at different stages of the production and business cycles. This means that even if there is evasion at one stage of the cycle the budget receives tax at the other stages. In the case of sales tax, evasion by a single taxpayer means that the budget loses the total tax amount.
Also, if a sales tax is introduced, it becomes necessary to reform the tax regime for small businesses, by creating rules for distinguishing the sales of goods and services for the purpose of final consumption and sales for the purpose of production. The point is that according to the logic of a tax levied at the stage of final consumption, goods and services that are purchased for business purposes should be exempt from taxation. To deter entrepreneurs from exploiting their status to purchase goods and services for personal, non-business purposes, the administration of sales tax could be arranged for entrepreneurs in a manner resembling the "export" scheme of VAT administration: individual entrepreneurs and other physical persons, regardless of the purpose for which goods and services were acquired, would pay the sales tax; but, in the event of onward sale of the purchased goods and services the final consumer would also be required to pay the tax. The difference between "input" and "output" sales tax would then be transferred to the budget. If entrepreneurs sold their goods and services to other entrepreneurs or organizations for production purposes, they would be entitled to appropriate reimbursement at the end of the tax period. Such a system does not differ from the system of VAT collection and that is why in many countries sales tax gradually turned into VAT.
In other words, the introduction of the so-called "simple and understandable" sales tax is possible only at considerable expense to taxpayers and with the creation of a special system of administration which would make it possible to distinguish between the sale of the same goods to either a final buyer or an intermediary reseller and also to identify any possible cascade effect, when the sale of one and the same product is taxed several times over.
The replacement of value-added tax with a sales tax would, therefore, be risky in conditions of globalization and Russia's growing participation in world economic relations.
Certainly, in the absence of VAT there would be no need to maintain the system of VAT refund to exporters. However, in the absence of VAT, imported goods would also not be taxed. Under VAT only exported goods are taxed at zero rate and in the majority of countries this provides a competitive advantage to these goods in the country of destination. Unless the rules governing territoriality are harmonized with trading partners, difficulties arise in relation to the taxation of goods and services in cross-border transactions. At the same time, the operation of the cascade effect suggests that even if sales tax is collected only at the stage of retail sale, exports would not entirely escape indirect taxation.
One thing is clear -large Russian corporations operating inside Russia, whose activities are not related to the production on a large scale of consumer goods or goods for the domestic market have a vested interest in the abolition of VAT. On the one hand, abolition would allow them significantly to reduce their tax payments without bearing the burden of a new sales tax in the short term; and, on the other hand, it would assist them in reducing other costs associated with the VAT refund for exports and ever-increasing taxation of imports and an opportunity for avoiding the taxation of sales and purchases of services, the place of realization of which, according to current tax legislation is deemed to be the territory of the Russian Federation. Not surprisingly, having substantial resources at their disposal, these advocates of the abolition of VAT are able to enlist, by a variety of methods, an ever increasing number of allies, including employees of public authorities. Yet this policy is economically senseless and could cause serious economic damage in a long term.
A realistic estimate of the impact of the replacement of VAT by a sales tax must take into account the volume of revenues foregone and then estimate the value of possible revenues under different rates of sales tax, using the economic indicators of 2009 whilst allowing for the impact of the abolition of VAT on the level of business activity.
Following the logic of revenue losses to the budget when the VAT rate was reduced to 12% under the third scenario, we estimate that the loss of revenues to the budget in the event of abolition of VAT and allowing for partial offset by additional revenue from other taxes would be about 4.1-4. 3% of GDP under 2009 conditions (in 2009, revenues from VAT were planned to be 6.4% of GDP).
In order to estimate what share of reduced income would be offset by the introduction of a sales tax, we must first define the tax base. For example, when experts of the Finance Academy 8 in 2006 attempted to calculate potential revenues from the sales tax, they significantly enlarged the base of the tax by comparison with previous Russian practice. In addition to household expenditures on final consumption (purchase of any goods, works and services), they included the expenditures of organizations, with no allowance against the gross totals for profits tax; and also state purchases of goods and services from outside organization.
In our view, such a definition of the tax base is not appropriate.
Firstly, the imposition of sales tax on public (municipal) procurement is equivalent to redistribution of budget funds amongst different levels of the budget system. Moreover, the sales tax is a mechanism for the taxation of final consumption, whereas, in the procurement process, government authorities only formally act as final consumers. Local authorities are, in fact, intermediaries in the production and commercial chain of delivery of goods (works, services) to the population and so their procurement should not be subject to sales tax.
As regards the expenditures of organizations towards funding the final consumption of employees, these derive either from the social insurance fund (vouchers for children's holiday camps, health resorts, etc.) or from the net profit of organizations (payment of communal services, food, recreation, education, etc. for employees) and are regarded as benefits in kind that are liable to personal income tax. In other words, there is no sale of goods, works or services and, consequently, no object of taxation in such operations.
In our view, if the base of the sales tax is to be broader than that of the previous model, only sales to physical entities for cash and non-cash payment (including bank cards) of all goods (works, services) should be regarded as subject to taxation. It is reasonable to exclude from taxation transactions in real estate and the acquisition of valuables (precious metals and stones, antiques, works of art, etc.) that can retain their value over the long term, since they are not items of final consumption and represent gross savings in the economy. Following the same logic, transactions with financial instruments (securities, foreign currency, deposits, loans, insurance instruments, shares, etc.) should be excluded from the list of taxable goods.
Since the base of the proposed sales tax is the value of final goods (services) sold to a physical person, its approximate value can be estimated by reference to household expenditure on final consumption, less the value of goods and services received in kind (as wage payments or produced by households for their own consumption) and the net amount of purchases of goods and services made abroad. 9 One can see from the calculations ( In other words, only if sales tax is set at 10% will revenues reach the level of losses to be expected from the abolition of VAT (4.4% of GDP), that is, compensate for these losses.
However, this would apply only in the highly improbable eventuality of 100% of the tax being collected. The actual collection rate of sales tax in 2002 was 30%. This level may be considered as a first scenario for estimating the collectability of the tax. A second scenario would be to assume the same rate of collectability as obtains with VAT, which is calculated as the ratio of actual VAT revenues to a theoretical amount estimated using socio-economic statistics. According to estimates, this ratio was approximately 57% on average for the period 2003-2007. 10 Estimates of potential revenues using economic indicators of 2009 with different rates of sales tax are given in Table 8 . Balance of incoming and lost revenues, % of GDP:
--assuming collection of 30% -2.9 -3,1 -3,5
--assuming collection of 57% -1.7 -2,2 -2,9
For reference: revenue from the sales tax levied in Russia before 2004, % of GDP 0.5
Source: authors' estimates
As may be seen from the estimates, revenues from the introduction of the new sales tax in 2009, depending on the rate of tax and level of assumed collectability, varied from 0.7% to 2.5% of GDP. At the same time, a new sales tax, even at a rate of 10% cannot compensate for the loss of revenues, which would at this rate have amounted from 1.7% to 2.9% of GDP.
Moreover, to achieve the level of revenues from the sales tax specified in the Table, all organizations and business involved in retail trade would have to be taxed irrespective of any special tax status that they enjoy and levy sales tax on all goods, works and services consumed by the population, including those not currently subject to VAT. This means that the losses of budget revenues resulting from the replacement of VAT by a sales tax would probably be significantly greater than in the estimates.
Impact on the budget of a transition to VAT under the Addition Method
In 2007 there were lengthy discussions of the merits of the so-called Addition Method of calculating VAT. 11 This would involve replacing the current Invoice Method by the use of balance sheet data on profits and wages as the basis for calculating value added. For a given accounting period value added by the taxpayer would be estimated as the sum of profit, wages bill, single social tax and taxes paid on output.
It is argued that the main advantage of the Addition Method is that it does not require procedures for reimbursing input VAT and that this would greatly simplify tax administration.
However, this would only be possible if the rules of territoriality for paying VAT were amended.
Currently in Russia, as in the majority of its trading partners, in the collection of VAT the principle of taxation by country of destination applies: exports are exempt from VAT and imports are taxed. A change-over to taxation in the country where value is added (the Addition Method), with no refund of VAT, presupposes application of the principle of taxation in country of origin, whereby exports are subjected to VAT and imports are exempt.
Both systems for levying VAT can be effective provided counterpart-countries apply the same principles in their foreign trade relations. Otherwise the goods exported from one country to another could be subject to VAT in both countries. Alternatively, reverse export would not be subject to VAT in either country. This would impact upon the competitiveness of Russian goods exported abroad. Here we need to take into account the fact that medium-term forecasts of socio-economic development of Russia suggest that there will be a substantial deterioration in the balance of export-import transactions (potentially to zero), and so the budget might receive no benefit from adopting the principle of taxation in country of origin.
Conscious of the impossibility of an amendment to the territorial principle of VAT collection in Russia, the draft legislation ("Concept" document) for reform of VAT has adopted a dual approach, whereby there would be no refund of VAT in the domestic market, whilst exporters would continue to reimbursed for input VAT (VAT on materials and components of exported goods). But whereas at present the refund is made on the basis of receipts of input tax paid, the Concept document envisages "verifying the tax offset or refund against contracts, invoices (bank documents), shipping documents, customs declarations and calculations". As things stand, the reimbursement process is laborious enough, but in the proposed reform exporters would only be able to challenge an assessment through the courts, since documentation that does not record deductions of VAT cannot provide the tax authorities with a basis for accurate estimates.
This means that the principal merit of the method of Addition Method, as understood in the "Concept" document is negated, whilst the proposed system for refund of VAT to exporters will complicate arrangements that are already problematical.
Second, it should be noted that under the Invoice Method VAT is charged as the difference between output and input tax at different stages of the production and sales chain.
This makes it possible to track compliance at all stages. Under the Addition Method, as understood in the "Concept" document, no use of invoices is envisaged, so it will be possible to ascertain the degree of compliance only by auditing the profit and loss account and the wages bill.
Thirdly, the transition to the Addition Method envisages the abolition of tax credits and refunds and so a problem arises in relation to the reimbursement of VAT on investment products as is practiced under the existing system. It is clear that canceling reimbursement will increase the cost of investments by a sum equivalent to the rate of VAT, whereas the inclusion of VAT on investments goods in input tax in a given tax period does not significantly affect the overall tax yield.
Fourthly, despite the fact that the indirect character of the tax is preserved, under the Addition Method, tax will be levied as a percentage (the tax rate) of objects of direct taxation, i.e., profits and wages bill, and so, in reality, for taxpayers VAT will become a direct tax. Moreover, taxpayers will acquire opportunities for altering their tax liabilities, by adjustments to profits and the wages bill. Quite probably, this will make for a return of "gray" schemes of payment of wages, with a view to avoiding payment of both unified social tax and VAT) and of attempts to disguise taxable profits (for example, through "fictitious works or services provided by fly by night companies").
Fifthly, the "Conception" document does not include in value added such elements as tax on output (land tax, vehicle tax, property tax) and so actual value added will be taxed incompletely.
Sixthly, according to the "Conception", imports are exempt from taxation, notwithstanding the fact that collection of VAT on imports is highly efficient and makes a substantial contribution to the national budget. Moreover, foreign goods that are exempt from VAT will gain a significant competitive (price) advantage over domestic goods.
Seventhly, the proposed Addition Method proposed by the KSPSR cannot be applied by a tax agency since it will not possess information on profit, wages, etc., for completed transactions.
And finally, one should take into account the fact that despite all the complexity of administration of the current system of VAT, taxpayers and tax authorities already possess the necessary skills for assessment, payment and compliance with tax laws. The introduction of a new system involves the need for developing and testing completely new approaches to compliance and administration. As a result, there will be at the outset additional administrative costs, both to businesses and to the tax service.
All of the above arguments and the absence of positive international experience of the Addition Method 12 point to the conclusion that the reform proposed in the "Conception" document is unlikely to enhance the effectiveness of collection of VAT and that it cannot seriously be considered as means of improving the system of taxation as a whole.
In order to make a comprehensive assessment of the impact of transferring to the According to the tax statistics (see Table. 9), the largest amount of exemptions apply in the financial sector of the economy in the following operations: The estimates are presented in Table 10 . There are several reasons for such high values for tax proceeds: Firstly, since the necessary statistical data are not available, the share of value added created by the taxpayers under special tax regimes and by those exempt from VAT has not been excluded from the total of value added.
Secondly, under the Addition Method, investment expenditure, which according to Art. 39 of the Tax Code does not relate to sales operations and is not subject to VAT, is not excluded from the tax base.
Thirdly, under the Addition Method the value-added created in export is subject to taxation, whereas the value of imported goods is not included in the tax base. 
What should be done?
There is no doubt that current problems with delays of VAT refund to exporters and the extensive use of "gray" refunding schemes inflict significant damage on the federal budget and require urgent resolution. However, in our view, it is also clear that the existing problems of VAT administration should not be resolved by radical tax reform.
Measures that have been taken to address certain specific problems in the tax code, in the absence of the kind of comprehensive approach that was adopted in 2000, when Chapter 21 of the Tax Code was being developed, have damaged the effectiveness of certain provisions of tax legislation and there are instances in which the law on VAT is an impediment to the conduct of business. All of this adds to such basic problems as the absence of a tradition of administration and of implementation of tax legislation, the specific shortcomings of the judicial system and inadequate monitoring of the ability of tax authorities to carry out their responsibilities, enforce compliance and, for a variety of reasons, reach reasonable and balanced decisions.
We should also bear in mind that, given the current rate of VAT and specific features of the Russian economy (high share of exports, low level of institutional development, magnitude of the shadow sector, etc.), budget revenues from VAT for a variety of objective reasons, exceed forecasts. This means that in the nearest future it is quite possible that some measures for reform that will improve the efficiency and impartiality of the tax and reduce the costs of compliance to taxpayers will reduce VAT revenues, As a priority, the following steps should be taken: 1) Streamline and simplify procedures for refund of VAT where a zero rate applies and in similar cases. In particular, for confirmation of export only one proof should be requiredthe fact of transfer of goods across the customs border. The requirement to produce such documents as proof of payment for exports or a contract exclusively with a foreign buyer should be abolished. Particular attention should be paid to procedures for application of the zero rate to export-related services (for example, when the goods are transported by pipeline, taking into account the specificities of arranging this kind of transportation, the nature of the goods being transported, requirements for periodic temporary declaration, and the export of goods by rail).
2) Harmonize various provisions of the Tax Code that relate to VAT and eliminate internal inconsistencies. In countries using VAT, for the majority of taxpayers, not involved in complex operations, this tax is one of the easiest as regards calculation and payment. We should try to achieve this simplicity in Russia. To this end, the rules for processing invoices should be amended, the rules for tax offset in various circumstances should be unified, as well as the rules on exemptions; the wording of the Tax Code, which is often ambiguous and creates problems for both taxpayers and tax authorities should be clarified.
3) Improve the effectiveness of the monitoring agencies. This means creating viable working relations between tax authorities and customs authorities; setting up a monitoring system based on modern methods of risk assessment of tax avoidance that is not disclosed to taxpayers but is used exclusively by the tax authorities; increasing the level of accountability of tax officials and expanding their powers of decision-making, including the right to make decisions based on professional judgment as to compliance of the taxpayer with the spirit and letter of the Tax Code; elimination of corruption in public bodies and an improvement in the system of registration of taxpayers.
